RAPA Closing Argument

Revenue Requirement

Cost-of-Service, Rate Design

Return on Equity

Rate Base: 13-month average v. year end \$2.9 Million

Order U-07-076(8)/U-07-077(8) at 39 Recognized Commission has made various modifications to historical precedent for year-end rate base.


But said:

"the first step of the analysis has always been an evaluation and conclusion that the change in *net* plant is abnormal. Only after this *threshold test* is met do the other operational factors...weigh in the equation to determine if the use of year-end rate base is appropriate." (emphasis added)


Rate Base: 13-month average v. year end \$2.9 Million

Fairchild-Hamilton at Q/A 27—Growth in net plant = \$24,710,873 (Undisputed)
Growth in *net* plant = 10.15%

Reflecting amount when rates will be in effect



Reflecting amount when rates will be in effect



Rate Base: 13-month average v. year end

	(a)	(b)	(c)	d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
	Year	Utility Plant Per Annual Report Page 110, Line 2	Net Utility Plant Per Annual Report Page 110, Line 10	Increase Utility Plant Since Prior Rate Case TY	Increase Net Plant Since Prior Rate Case TY	% Increase in PIS Since last TY	% Increase in Net Plant Since last TY
1999 TY for U-00- 088	1999	305,736,581	165,359,836				
	2000	319,143,393	170,374,322	13,406,812	5,014,486	4.39%	3.03%
	2001	328,080,939	170,165,217	22,344,358	4,805,381	7.31%	2.91%
	2002	336,714,597	169,915,937	30,978,016	4,556,101	10.13%	2.76%
	2003	345,359,316	169,777,314	39,622,735	4,417,478	12.96%	2.67%
	2004	361,543,507	178,216,898	55,806,926	12,857,062	18.25%	7.78%
	2005	381,068,664	187,225,365	75,332,083	21,865,529	24.64%	13.22%
	2006	395,064,903	191,445,920	89,328,322	26,086,084	29.22%	15.78%
	2007	401,838,777	190,974,764	96,102,196	25,614,928	31.43%	15.49%
2008 TY for U-09- 69/70	2008	415,107,020	198,676,463			7	
	2009	425,906,366	197,051,166	10,799,346	(1,625,297)	2.60%	-0.82%
建筑器性基础	2010	435,949,833	212,621,481	20,842,813	13,943,018	5.02%	7.02%
	2011	471,344,081	223,089,585	56,237,061	24,413,122	13.55%	12.29%
2013 TY for U-14- 111	2013	500,025,591	229,199,028				
	2014	523,753,292	244,638,256	23,727,701	15,439,228	4.75%	6.74%
2015 TY for U-16- 066	2015	555,449,998	268,404,445				
	2016	571,122,970	272,009,910	15,672,972	3,605,465	2.82%	1.34%

Rate Base: 13-month average v. year end \$2.9 Million Regulatory Lag

ENSTAR asserts needs year-end rate base to combat regulatory lag.

Exhibit H-73: AG-ENSTAR-R2-1 Showed ENSTAR with plant balance increases more than Current case, but no filed rate case until years later.

Apparently regulatory lag not really a problem.

No allow return-on-return

Exhibit H-73—ENSTAR responses to discovery Request AG-ENSTAR-R2-3(a) & (b)

- (a) Asked ENSTAR to the amount of CINGSA's return component included in ENSTAR's stored gas account. Answer: \$7,769,628.
- (b) Asked how much of the CINGSA return went to SEMCO.

Answer: \$5,050,258.

- 2 alternatives the Commission could consider
 - The prior carrying costs

Mr. Dieckgraeff testified that the prior carrying cost was 3.25%

Not RAPA's position

But, something Commission can consider.

- 2 alternatives the Commission could consider
 - Current carrying costs

Mr. Moses testified that parent company loaned ENSTAR funds to cover these fees. (beginning at 610:12—page:line)

Mr. Moses had explained that these are short-term loans. (beginning at 609:17)

Well, we're precluded from charging when the utilities are in a borrowing position, we're precluding from charging anything different than what SEMCO would pay on its short-term credit facilities.

- 2 alternatives the Commission could consider
 - Current carrying costs

Mr. Moses testified that parent company loaned ENSTAR funds to cover these fees. (beginning at 610:12—page:line)

Mr. Moses had explained that these are short-term loans. (beginning at 609:17)

Commission could consider allowing the 2.55% carrying cost on the CINGSA fees

Bonuses \$1,655,687

ENSTAR has burden to prove Bonuses should be in RR Order U-83-053(32) at 31

Factors to consider:

- (1) whether salaries are not fully compensatory
- (2) discretionary—scope & mechanics of incentive plan
- (3) recurring—represent amount paid in future
- (4) any bonuses an affiliate transaction—AS 42.05.511(c)
- (5) are bonuses based on achieving over- or excessive-earnings

2.50%

H-33

Bonuses \$1,655,687

(1) whether salaries are not fully compensatory

H-33 and H-34—ENSTAR's best evidence to support its total compensation for its salaried employees.

ENSTAR purposefully excluded information that was "too low".

Bonuses \$1,655,687

(2) discretionary—scope & mechanics of incentive plan

Performance target metrics

Exhibit 16

CINGSA Operating Income
CINGSA CAPEX—benefit CINGSA ratepayers
which includes more than ENSTAR ratepayers
CINGSA Found gas, Obtain approval for, and sell
0.8 bcf of gas—100% benefit to CINGSA shareholders

Bonuses \$1,655,687

- (2) discretionary—scope & mechanics of incentive plan
- (5) are bonuses based on achieving over- or excessive-earnings



Short-Term Incentive Plan 2015 Award Reconciliation

Metric	Upper Target \$	Adjusted \$	Variance \$	% of Target	
EBITDA	\$141.5 M	\$145.2 M	\$3.7 M	102.6%	
		Diam Dayout for 1	02.6% Achievemen	t of Target 150%	

ob Title President, ENSTAR Natural Gas	_
Mr. Green testified that this EBITDA was both Alaska and	1
Michigan, and if either has not performed to meet their	
threshold, then no bonus is paid.	
(beginning at 287:2)	
G : CALL Live de se met monet its EDITOA requirement then	
So if Michigan does not meet its EBITDA requirement, then	
ENSTAR does not pay bonuses, even if bonuses were included	
by the Commission in ENSTAR's revenue requirement.	ward)
nd!	Assert
A phantom expense.	nce STIP

hOTE: Payments such as this STIP Award are taxed at the IRS-required 25% supplemental wage rate (federal taxes).

CONFIDENTIAL Exhibit JKF-15 U-16-066 February 7, 2017 Page 1 of 1

CONFIDENTIAL - U-16-056 ENG07459 Short-Term Incentive Plan All salaried employees Not just executives



Metric Upper Target \$ Adjusted \$ Variance \$ % of Target
BITDA \$141.5 M \$145.2 M \$3.7 M L02.6%

Plan Payout for 102.6% Achievement of Target 150%

Base Salary
STIP Eligibility Award %
Plan Payout

Say Matrice

Rey Metric Key Metric Adjusted Key

Key Matrics Award Ranking Matric Award (Finandal metric ranking x award) \$43,825.60 Financial Metric(s) @ 33% \$43,825.60 100% (Customer metric ranking x award) Customer Metric(s) @ 33% \$43.825.60 100% \$43,825.60 (Employer metric ranking x award) 100% \$43,825.68 For this one employee (Total key metric award) \$131,476.79 35% STIP of \$250,432 = \$87,651.20

Adjusted Individual Indi Bual Individual Performance Natric Ferfo lance Performance Performance Award Rai ing Award (Individual performance ranking x award) \$131,476.79 Individual Performance Ranking % \$131,476.79 (Total individual performance award) \$131,476.79 Individual Performance STIP Award Opportunity

Total 2015 Award \$131,476.80 (The lesser value of Key Metric STIP Award Copportunity and Individual Performance STIP Award Opportunity)

NOTE: Payments such as this STIP Award are taxed at the IRS-required 25% supplemental wage rate (federal taxes).

CONFIDENTIAL Exhibit JKF-15 U-16-066 February 7, 2017 Page 1 of 1

CONFIDENTIAL - U-16-066 ENS07450

Bonuses \$1,655,687

(5) are bonuses based on achieving over- or excessive-earnings

During test year, STIP bonuses were paid at 150% because ENSTAR exceeded the upper target for earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.

Exhibit H-18 shows STIP for 2015 test year of \$1,050,231.71—includes the increased bonus because of achieved earnings above target

Weather Normalization \$1,825,504

Dr. Fairchild admitted that his calculation adds Declining use—extrapolated into the future

Declining use was hotly disputed in last rate case (U-14-111) where ENSTAR used a model from Dr. Brown

No declining use testimony in direct testimony in this case.

RAPA used actual test-year data

Insurance \$33,398

ENSTAR took December 2015 premium (the highest) and multiplied by 12

RAPA recommends using actual test-year amount

Dr. Fairchild admitted in cross examination that the adjustment was same as a Year-end rate base adjustment

Meaning it is based on the last (highest) amount.

Prepaid Expenses/CWC \$1,662,007

Dr. Fairchild testified lead/lag CWC same thing

His hypothetical to refute the double-count (Reply at 20:14 to 21:6) uses insurance as proof.

Exhibit H-37, AG-ENSTAR-7-7(e) asked if any insurance payments in the lead/lag.

ENSTAR discovery response: No insurance payments in lead/lag

Miscellaneous Expenses \$317,005

Pizza parties

BBQ

Donuts

Pies for celebrations

Ice Cream

Cake

Golf

811 Onesies

Lobbying

Miscellaneous Expenses \$317,005

Order U-00-088(12) at 17 & 18

ENSTAR referred to the GHU case—

But Ms. Fairchild-Hamilton explained that GHU's had shown that the employee appreciation expenditures had saved GHU \$10,000 on its union employee contract. So, in that single case the Commission allowed the utility to include \$10,000 in employee appreciation, etc., costs.

ENSTAR has made no such showing in the present case.

Credit Card Processing \$600,031

ENSTAR wants amount for 60% of customers— \$835,324 84,104 transactions per month

Commissioner Rokeberg noted that based on latest numbers only about 30% of customers are using credit card payment.

That is half of what ENSTAR requested.

Rate Case Expense \$1,800,000 + amount from U-14-111 Amortized 3 years: \$729,680 per year Disputed amount \$366,664 per year Plus \$129,800 prior rate case expense

ENSTAR wants actual expense/true-up = guaranteed recovery

Rate Case Expense \$1,800,000 + amount from U-14-111 Amortized 3 years: \$729,680 per year Disputed amount \$366,664 per year Plus \$129,800 prior rate case expense

Order U-00-088(12) at 24-25

The goal is to develop an estimate of future rate case cost, rather than recovering past rate case expenditures.

ENSTAR did not provide any trend analysis or an analysis Developing an estimate of future rate case expense. Rather, ENSTAR merely asks for its actual costs.

Economy Energy Revenue and Volumes

Economy energy sales adjust revenues and impact any revenue deficiency.

Volumes impact COSS/Rate Design

Page 829

REGULATORY COMMISSION OF ALASKA Docket No. U-16-066 Public Hearing

June 8, 2017

1	like it's looking at the audience, that	
2	sandwich is probably in the \$100,000 range by	
3	now.	
4	Is it a fact that you've just	
5	gone through the books and looked to find	
6	every kind of expense that you could put in a	
7	rate base and attempt to justify it here, and	
8	if the Commission allows it, we allow it; if	
9	we don't, we don't?	
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REGULATORY COMMISSION OF ALASKA Docket No. U-16-066 Public Hearing

June 8, 2017

Tike it's -- looking at the audience, that sandwich is probably in the \$100,000 range by 3 now. Is it a fact that you've just gone through the books and looked to find every kind of expense that you could put in a rate base and attempt to justify it here, and if the Commission allows it, we allow it; if we don't, we don't? 10 MR. SIMS: I don't know that that's entirely true. You know, our 11 12 regulatory staff does the best job they can. You see the filing that we have. There are 13 line items of expenses and those get 14 submitted in the revenue requirement. They 15 absolutely have taken out expenses, and I 16 still think that the expenses that you see 17 here are absolutely a part of doing business 18 for this company. 19

"Loaded-up" Rate Case

First: During ENSTAR redirect, Mr. Dieckgraeff stated That \$9 million from the 2016 capital budget (ERT program and Potter) were moved up, but that decision was made in August prior to acceptance of the U-14-111 stipulation.

On July 23, 2015, ENSTAR filed an unopposed motion to vacate hearing dates based upon the mediated settlement.

"Loaded-up" Rate Case

Third—Mr. Dieckgraeff stated repeatedly that the time period between ENSTAR rate cases is usually 3-5 years.

That means when ENSTAR began the capital projects in 2015 test year, it did not expect a rate case to recover those costs for 3 to 5 years (a 2018 to 2020 test year with 2019 to 2021 rate case).

Either ENSTAR rushed to complete projects in 2015 TY; or

It did not expect to seek recovery until 2019 at soonest

Seaboard v. 3CP Rate Design Cost of Service

FERC Cost of Service Manual Seaboard

United—put 75% on transmission customers

Straight Fixed Variable

Commissioner McAlpine raised the issue of whether a municipal-owned utility is less risky than an investorowned.

RAPA asserted a similar argument in Docket U-06-045and lost.

In Order U-06-045(7) at 27 the Commission refused to deviate from its "policy of establishing the cost of equity for municipally-owned utilities using the same methods [the Commission] use[s] for privately-owned utilities."

Is Mr. Hevert's range inflated in the current Docket? What came to light in the hearing:

- Mr. Hevert agreed in cross that the cost of capital had gone down for local distribution gas utilities since 2002
- He asserted that the cost of capital for a gas transmission utility had stayed flat.

Assuming 12.55% was correct in 2002 then the ROE should have come down to reflect the reduction in cost of capital for LDC gas utilities.

But it did not.

Is Mr. Hevert's range inflated in the current Docket? What came to light in the hearing:

- He admitted that investors consider available information, but he did not include geometric mean in his analysis.
- He admitted that he was aware of the statement by Moody's as to SEMCO: "Supportive regulatory environments in both Michigan and Alaska provide a strong suite of cost recovery mechanisms."
- He admitted that he was aware of AltaGas' representation that it focuses on acquiring high-quality, low-risk, long term energy assets.

Regardless, the 12.55% ROE was not lowered.

Mr. Parcell recommended an ROE of 9.825%

Mr. Lawton recommended an ROE of 10.00%